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Abstract
Time series anomalies can offer information rel-
evant to critical situations facing various fields,
from finance and aerospace to the IT, secu-
rity, and medical domains. However, detecting
anomalies in time series data is particularly chal-
lenging due to the vague definition of anomalies
and said data’s frequent lack of labels and highly
complex temporal correlations. Current state-of-
the-art unsupervised machine learning methods
for anomaly detection suffer from scalability and
portability issues, and may have high false posi-
tive rates. In this paper, we propose TadGAN, an
unsupervised anomaly detection approach built
on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). To
capture the temporal correlations of time series
distributions, we use LSTM Recurrent Neural
Networks as base models for Generators and
Critics. TadGAN is trained with cycle consis-
tency loss to allow for effective time-series data
reconstruction. We further propose several novel
methods to compute reconstruction errors, as
well as different approaches to combine recon-
struction errors and Critic outputs to compute
anomaly scores. To demonstrate the performance
and generalizability of our approach, we test
several anomaly scoring techniques and report
the best-suited one. We compare our approach
to 8 baseline anomaly detection methods on 11
datasets from multiple reputable sources such as
NASA, Yahoo, Numenta, Amazon, and Twitter.
The results show that our approach can effec-
tively detect anomalies and outperform baseline
methods in most cases (6 out of 11). Notably, our
method has the highest averaged F1 score across
all the datasets. Our code is open source and is
available as a benchmarking tool.
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Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain. Correspondence to: Kalyan Veera-
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1. Introduction
The recent proliferation of temporal observation data has
led to an increasing demand for time series anomaly detec-
tion in many domains, from energy and finance to health-
care and cloud computing. A time series anomaly is de-
fined as a time point or period where a system behaves
unusually [8]. Broadly speaking, there are two types of
anomalies: A point anomaly is a single data point that has
reached an unusual value, while a collective anomaly is
a continuous sequence of data points that are considered
anomalous as a whole, even if the individual data points
may not be unusual [8].
Time series anomaly detection aims to isolate anomalous
subsequences of varied lengths within time series. One
of the simplest detection techniques is thresholding, which
detects data points that exceed a normal range [8]. How-
ever, many anomalies do not exceed any boundaries – for
example, they may have values that are purportedly “nor-
mal,” but are unusual at the specific time that they occur
(i.e., contextual anomalies). These anomalies are harder
to identify because the context of a signal is often unclear
[1, 8].
Various statistical methods have been proposed to im-
prove upon thresholding, such as Statistical Process Con-
trol (SPC) [39], in which data points are identified as
anomalies if they fail to pass statistical hypothesis testing.
But these methods are unable to handle multivariate data
streams, and statistical features are often unknown and var-
ious.
Researchers have also studied a number of unsupervised
machine learning-based approaches to anomaly detection.
One popular method consists of segmenting a time series
into subsequences (overlapping or otherwise) of a certain
length and applying clustering algorithms to find outliers.
Another learns a model that either predicts or reconstructs a
time series signal, and makes comparison between the real
and the predicted or reconstructed values. High prediction
or reconstruction errors suggest the presence of anomalies.
Deep learning methods [22] are extremely capable of han-
dling non-linearity in complex temporal correlations, and
have excellent learning ability. For this reason, they have
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Outperforms
Deep learning based method ARIMA, 1970 [6]
LSTM AutoEncoder, 2016 [27] 5
LSTM, 2018 [21] 5
MAD-GAN, 2019 [24] 0
MS Azure, 2019 [30] 0
DeepAR, 2019 [32] 6
TadGAN 8
Table 1. The number of wins of a particular method compared
with ARIMA, the traditional time series forecasting model,
against an appropriate metric (f1 score) on 11 real datasets.
been used in a number of time series anomaly detection
methods [14, 21, 26], including tools created by compa-
nies such as Microsoft [30]. Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs) [16] have also been shown to be very suc-
cessful at generating time series sequences and outperform-
ing state-of-the-art benchmarks [37]. Such a proliferation
of methods invites the question: Do these new, complex ap-
proaches actually perform better than a simple baseline sta-
tistical method? To evaluate the new methods, we used 11
datasets (real and synthetic) that collectively have 492 sig-
nals and thousands of known anomalies to set-up a bench-
marking system (see the details in Section 5 and Table 3).
We implemented 5 of the most recent deep learning tech-
niques introduced between 2016 and 2019, and compared
their performances with that of a baseline method from the
1970s, ARIMA. While some methods were able to beat
ARIMA on 50% of the datasets, two methods failed to out-
perform it at all (c.f. Table 1).
One of the foundational challenges with deep learning-
based approaches is its remarkable ability to fit the data.
As a result, it could fit the anomalous data as well. For
example, autoencoders, using L2 objective function, could
fit and reconstruct the data extremely accurately - thus fit-
ting the anomalies as well. On the other hand, GANs, may
be ineffective in learning the generator to fully capture the
data hidden distribution, thus causing false alarms. Hence,
we find the necessity to create a more nuanced approach
by mixing the two methods. Additionally, frequently in
these works, much of the emphasis is on the deep learn-
ing model itself. However, as we show in this paper, the
post-processing steps could aid significantly in reducing
the number of false positives.
In this work, we introduce a novel GAN architecture,
TadGAN, for time series domain. We use TadGAN to re-
construct time series and assess errors in a contextual man-
ner to identify anomalies. We explore different ways to
compute anomaly scores based on the outputs from Gener-
ators and Critics. We benchmark our method against sev-
eral well-known classical and deep learning based methods
on eleven time-series datasets. The detailed results can be
found in Table 3.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel unsupervised GAN-
reconstruction-based anomaly detection method
for time series data. In particular, we introduce a
cycle-consistent GAN architecture for time-series to
time-series mapping.
• We identify two time series similarity measures suit-
able for evaluating the contextual similarity between
original and GAN-reconstructed sequences. Our
novel approach leverages both GAN’s Generator and
Critic to compute robust anomaly scores at every time
step.
• We conduct an extensive evaluation using 11 time-
series datasets from 3 reputable entities (NASA, Ya-
hoo, and Numenta), demonstrating that our approach
outperforms other 8 baselines. We further provide sev-
eral insights into anomaly detection for time series
data using GANs.
• We develop a benchmarking system for time se-
ries anomaly detection. The system is open-sourced
and can be extended with additional approaches and
datasets1. The benchmark, by the time of this writ-
ing, has included 9 anomaly detection pipelines, 13
datasets, and 2 evaluation mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of the related literature. Section 3 in-
troduces the details of our GAN model. Afterwards, we
describe how to use GANs for anomaly detection in Sec-
tion 4, followed by the evaluation of our proposed frame-
work in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper
and reports our key findings.
2. Related Work
2.1. Anomaly Detection for Time Series Data.
The rich variety of anomaly types, data types and applica-
tion scenarios has spurred a range of detection approaches
over the past several years [8, 15, 18, 20]. The simplest of
which are out-of-limit methods, which flag regions where
values exceed a certain threshold [10, 28]. While these
methods are intuitive, they are inflexible and incapable of
detecting contextual anomalies. To overcome this more
advanced techniques, namely: proximity-based, prediction-
based, and reconstruction-based, have been proposed.
1The software is available at github
(https://github.com/signals-dev/Orion). Here
we supply a local version that we are using for benchmarking (
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rlnr_Z_1uo2VQegt7gthemS6C1vRgEGx/view?usp=sharing)
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Proximity-based methods first use a distance measure to
quantify similarity between objects – single data points for
point anomalies, or fixed length sequences of data points
for collective anomalies. Objects that are distant from oth-
ers are considered as anomalies. This detection type can
be further divided into distance-based methods, such as K-
Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [3] – which use a given radius
to define neighbors of an object and use the number of
neighbors to determine an anomaly score – and density-
based methods, such as Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [7] and
Clustering-Based Local Outlier Factor [19], which further
consider the density of an object and that of its neighbors.
There are two major drawbacks to applying proximity-
based methods in time series data: (1) a priori knowledge
about anomaly duration and the number of anomalies is re-
quired; (2) these methods are unable to capture temporal
correlations.
Prediction-based methods learn a predictive model to fit
the given time series data, and then use that model to pre-
dict future values. A data point is identified as an anomaly
if the difference between its predicted input and the orig-
inal input exceeds a certain threshold. Statistical models,
such as ARIMA [29], Holt-Winters [29], and FDA [35],
can serve this purpose, but are sensitive to parameter se-
lection and often require strong assumptions and extensive
domain knowledge about the data. Machine learning based
approaches attempt to overcome these limitations. [1] intro-
duce Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM), an unsuper-
vised online sequence memory algorithm, to detect anoma-
lies in streaming data. HTM encodes the current input to a
hidden state and predicts the next hidden state. A prediction
error is measured by computing the difference between the
current hidden state and the predicted hidden state. Hund-
man et al. [21] propose Long Short Term Recurrent Neural
Networks (LSTM RNNs), to predict future time steps and
flag large deviations from predictions.
Reconstruction-based methods learn a model to capture
the latent structure (low-dimensional representations) of
the given time series data and then create a synthetic re-
construction of the data. Reconstruction-based methods
assume that anomalies lose information when they are
mapped to a lower dimension space, thereby cannot be
effectively reconstructed; thus, high reconstruction errors
suggest high chances of being anomalies.
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [31], a
dimensionality-reduction technique, can be used to
reconstruct data, but it is limited to linear reconstruction
and requires data to be highly correlated and to follow a
Gaussian distribution [9]. More recently deep learning
based techniques have been investigated. These include the
use of Auto-Encoder (AE) [2], Variational Auto-Encoder
(VAE) [2] and LSTM Encoder-Decoder [27].
However, without proper regularization, these
reconstruction-based methods may easily get overfit-
ted, resulting in low performance. In this work, we
propose to use adversarial learning to allow for time series
reconstruction. We introduce an intuitive approach for
regularizing reconstruction errors. The trained Generators
can be directly used to reconstruct more concise time series
data – thereby providing more accurate reconstruction
errors – while the Critics can offer scores as a powerful
complement to the reconstruction errors when computing
an anomaly score.
2.2. Anomaly Detection Using GANs.
Generative adversarial networks can successfully perform
many image-related tasks, including image generation [16],
image translation [41], and video prediction [36], and re-
searchers have recently demonstrated the effectiveness of
GANs for anomaly detection in images [11, 34].
Adversarial learning for images. Schlegl et al. [33] use
the Critic network in a GAN to detect anomalies in medi-
cal images. They also attempt to use the reconstruction loss
as an additional anomaly detection method, and find the in-
verse mapping from the data space to the latent space. This
mapping is done in a separate step, after the GAN is trained.
However, Zenati et al. [38] indicate that this method has
proven impractical for large data sets or real-time appli-
cations. They propose a bi-directional GAN for anomaly
detection in tabular and image data sets, which allows for
simultaneous training of the inverse mapping through an
encoding network.
The idea of training both encoder and decoder networks
was developed by Donahue et al. [12] and Dumoulin et
al. [13], who show how to achieve bidirectional GANs by
trying to match joint distributions. In an optimal situation,
the joint distributions are the same, and the Encoder and
Decoder must be inverses of each other. A cycle-consistent
GAN was introduced by Zhu et al. [41], who have two net-
works try to map into opposite dimensions, such that sam-
ples can be mapped from one space to the other and vice
versa.
Adversarial learning for time series. Prior GAN-related
work has rarely involved time series data, because the com-
plex temporal correlations within this type of data pose sig-
nificant challenges to generative modeling. Three works
published in 2019 are of note. First, to use GANs for
anomaly detection in time series, Li et al. [24] propose us-
ing a vanilla GAN model to capture the distribution of a
multivariate time series, and use the Critic to detect anoma-
lies. Another approach in this line is BeatGAN [40], which
is a Encoder and Decoder GAN architecture that allows for
the use of the reconstruction error for anomaly detection in
heartbeat signals. More recently, Yoon et al. [37] propose a
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time series GANwhich adopts the same idea but introduces
temporal embeddings to assist network training. However,
their work is designed for time series representation learn-
ing instead of anomaly detection.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first introduc-
ing cycle-consistent GAN architectures for time series data,
such that Generators can be directly used for time series
reconstructions. Besides, we systematically investigate
how to utilize Critic and Generator outputs for anomaly
score computation. A complete framework of time series
anomaly detection is introduced to work with GANs.
3. Adversarial Learning for time series
reconstruction
The core idea of reconstruction-based anomaly detection
method is to learn a model that can encode a data point
(a segment of time series in our case) and then decode
the encoded one (i.e., reconstructed one). An effective
model should not be able to reconstruct anomalies as well
as “normal” instances, because anomalies will lose infor-
mation during encoding. In our model, we learn two map-
ping functions between two domains X and Z , namely
E : X → Z and G : Z → X (Fig. 1). Where, X de-
notes the input data domain, describing the given training
samples {(x1...ti )}
N
i=1, x
1...t
i ∈ X . Z represents a standard
multivariate normal distribution, i.e., z ∼ PZ = N (0, I).
For convenience of notation we use xi to denote a time se-
quence of length t starting at time step i. With the map-
ping functions, we can reconstruct the input time series:
xi → E(xi)→ G(E(xi)) ≈ xˆi.
We propose to leverage adversarial learning approaches to
obtain the two mapping functions E and G. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, we view the two mapping functions as Gener-
ators. Note that E is serving as an Encoder which maps
the time series sequences into the latent space, while G is
serving as a Decoder that transforms the latent space into
the reconstructed time series. We further introduce two ad-
versarial Critics (aka discriminators) Cx and Cz . The goal
of Cx is to distinguish between real time series sequences
fromX and the generated time series sequences from G(z),
whereas Cz measures the goodness of the mapping into the
latent space. In other words, G is trying to fool Cx by gener-
ating real-looking sequences Thus, our high-level objective
consists of two types of terms: (1)Wasserstein losses [4] to
match the distribution of generated time series sequences to
the data distribution in the target domain; and (2) cycle con-
sistency losses [41] to prevent the contradiction between E
and G.
3.1. Wasserstein Loss
The original formulation of GAN that applies the stan-
dard adversarial losses (Eq. 1) suffers from the mode
collapse problem.
L = Ex∼PX [log Cx(x)] +Ez∼PZ [log(1−Cx(G(z)))] (1)
where Cx produces a probability score from 0 to 1 indicat-
ing the realness of the input time series sequence. To be
specific, theGenerator tends to learn a small fraction of the
variability of the data, leading to that the Generator cannot
perfectly converge to the target distribution. The key reason
behind is that the Generator prefers to produce those sam-
ples that have already been found to be good for fooling the
Critic and is reluctant to produce new ones. However, these
new ones might be helpful to capture other “modes” in the
data.
To overcome this limitation, we apply Wasserstein loss [4]
as the adversarial loss to train the GAN.We make use of the
Wasserstein-1 distance when training the Critic network.
Formally, let PX be the distribution over X . For the map-
ping function G : Z → X and its Critic Cx, we have the
following objective:
min
G
max
Cx∈Cx
VX(Cx,G) (2)
with
VX(Cx,G) = Ex∼PX [Cx(x)] − Ez∼PZ [Cx(G(z)))] (3)
where Cx ∈ Cx which denotes the set of 1-Lipschitz
continous functions. K-Lipschitz continous functions
are defined as follows: ‖f(x1) − f(x2)‖ ≤ K‖x1 −
x2‖, ∀x1, x2 ∈ domf . The Lipschitz continous functions
constrain the upper bound of the function, further smooth-
ing the function. Therefore, the weights will not change
dramatically when updated with gradient descent methods.
This reduces the risk of gradient explosion and make the
model training more stable and reliable. In addition, to en-
force the 1-Lipschitz constraint during training, we apply a
gradient penalty regularization term as introduced by Gul-
rajani et al. [17], which penalizes gradients not equal to 1
(cf. line 5).
Following the similar approach, we introduce aWasserstein
loss for the mapping function E : X → Z and its Critic Cz .
The objective is expressed as:
min
E
max
Cz∈Cz
VZ(Cz , E) (4)
The purpose of the second Critic Cz is to distinguish be-
tween random latent samples z ∼ PZ and encoded sam-
ples E(x) with x ∼ PX . We present the model type and
architecture for E , G, Cx, Cz in section 5.2.
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Cx
x ∼ PX L2 G(E(x)) G(z)
E G
E(x) z ∼ PZ
Cz
Figure 1. Model architecture
3.2. Cycle Consistency Loss
The purpose of our GAN is to reconstruct the input time
series: xi → E(xi) → G(E(xi)) ≈ xˆi. However, train-
ing the GAN with the adversarial losses (i.e., Wasserstein
losses) alone cannot guarantee mapping individual input xi
to a desired output zi which will be further mapped back to
xˆi. To reduce the possible mapping function search space,
we adapt cycle consistency loss to time series reconstruc-
tion. It was first introduced by Zhu et al. [41] for image
translation tasks. We train the generative network E and
G with the adapted cycle consistency loss by minimizing
the L2 norm of the difference between the original and the
reconstructed samples:
VL2(E ,G) = Ex∼PX [‖x− G(E(x))‖2] (5)
Considering that our target is anomaly detection, we use
L2 norm instead of L1 norm (the one used by Zhu et
al. [41] for image translation) to emphasize the impacts
of anomalous values. In our preliminary experiments, we
observed that adding the backward consistency loss (i.e.,
Ez∼Pz [‖z − E(G(z))‖2]) did not show an improved perfor-
mance.
3.3. Full Objective
Combining all of the objectives given in (3),(4) and (5)
leads to the final MinMax problem:
min
{E,G}
max
{Cx∈Cx,Cz∈Cz}
VX(Cx,G) + VZ(Cz, E) + VL2(E ,G)
(6)
The full architecture of our model can be seen in Figure
1. The benefits of this architecture with respect to anomaly
detection are twofold. First, we have a Critic Cx that is
trained to distinguish between real and fake time series se-
quences, hence the score of the Critic can directly serve as
an anomaly measure. Second, the two Generators trained
with cycle consistency loss allow us to encode and decode a
Algorithm 1. TadGAN
Input: m, batch size.
epoch, number of iterations over the data.
ncritic, number of iterations of the critic per epoch.
η, step size.
for each epoch do
for κ = 0, . . . , ncritic do
Sample {(x1...ti )}
m
i=1 from real data.
Sample {(z1...ki )}
m
i=1 from random.
gwCx = ∇wCx [
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cx(xi) −
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cx(G(zi)) + gp(xi,G(zi))]
wCx = wCx + η · adam(wCx , gwCx )
gwCz = ∇wCz [
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cz(zi) −
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cz(E(xi)) + gp(zi, E(xi))]
wCz = wCz + η · adam(wCz , gwCz )
end for
Sample {(x1...ti )}
m
i=1 from real data.
Sample {(z1...ki )}
m
i=1 from random.
gwG,E = ∇wG ,wE [
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cx(xi) −
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cx(G(zi)) +
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cz(zi) −
1
m
∑m
i=1 Cz(E(xi)) +
1
m
∑m
i=1 ‖xi − G(E(xi))‖2]
wG,E ,= wG,E + η · adam(wG,E , gwG,E )
end for
X = {(x1...ti )}
n
i=1
for i = 1, . . . , n do
xˆi = G(E(xi))
RE(xi) = f(xi, xˆi)
score = αZRE(xi) + (1− α)ZCx(xˆi)
end for
time series sequence. The difference between the original
sequence and the decoded sequence can be used as a sec-
ond anomaly detection measure. For the detailed training
steps, please refer to the pseudo code (cf. line 1–14). The
following section will introduce the details of how to use
TadGAN for anomaly detection.
4. Time-series GAN for anomaly detection
(TadGAN)
Let us assume that the given time series is (x1, x2, · · · , xT ),
where xi ⊆ RM×1 indicatesM types of measurements at
time step i. For simplicity, we use M = 1 in the later
description. Therefore, xi is viewed as a scalar afterwards.
The same steps can be applied for multivariate time series
(i.e., whenM > 1).
To obtain the training samples, we introduce a sliding win-
dow with window size t and step size s to divide the orig-
inal time series into N sub-sequences X = {(x1...ti )}
N
i=1,
where N = T−t
s
. In practice, it is difficult to know the
ground truth, and anomalous data points are rare. Hence,
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we assume all the training sample points are normal. In ad-
dition, we generateZ = {(z1...ki )}
N
i=1 from a random space
following normal distribution, where k denotes the dimen-
sion of the latent space. Then, we feed X and Z to our
GAN model and train it with the objective defined in (6).
With the trained model, we are able to compute anomaly
scores (or likelihoods) at every time step by leveraging the
reconstruction error and Critic output (cf. line 15–20).
4.1. Estimating Anomaly Scores using Reconstruction
Errors
Note that the time series (x1, x2, · · · , xT ), is divided into a
set of sub-sequences with a sliding window of window size
t and step size s. Thus, any individual data point at time
point j, xj would appear in. Given a sequence xi of length
t, TadGAN generates a reconstructed sequence of the same
length: xi → E(xi)→ G(E(xi)) ≈ xˆi. Therefore, for each
time point j, we have a collection of reconstructed values
{xˆqi , i + q = j} We take the median from the collection
as the final reconstructed value xˆj . Note that in the prelimi-
nary experiments, we found that using the median achieved
a better performance than using the mean. Now the recon-
structed time series is (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆT ). Here we propose
three different types of functions (cf. line 18) for comput-
ing the reconstruction errors at each time step (assume the
interval between neighbor time steps is the same).
Point-wise difference. This is the most intuitive way to
define the reconstruction error, which computes the differ-
ence between the true value and the reconstructed value at
every time step:
st =
∣∣xt − xˆt∣∣ (7)
Area difference. This is applied over windows of a certain
length to measure the similarity between local regions. It is
defined as the average difference between the areas beneath
two curves of length l:
st =
1
2 ∗ l
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ t+l
t−l
xt − xˆt dx
∣∣∣∣∣ (8)
Although this seems intuitive, it is not often used in this
context – however, we will show in our experiments that
this approach works well in many cases. Compared with
point-wise difference, area difference is good at identify-
ing the regions where small differences exist over a long
period of time. Since we are only given fixed samples of
the functions, we use the trapezoidal rule to calculate the
definite integral in the implementation.
Dynamic time warping (DTW). It aims to calculate the
optimal match between two given time sequences [5] and
is used to measure the similarity between local regions. We
have two time series X = (xt−1, xt−l+1, . . . , xt+l) and
Xˆ = (xˆt−1, xˆt−l+1, . . . , xˆt+l) and letW ∈ R2∗l×2∗l be a
matrix such that the (i, j)-th element is a distance measure
between xi and xˆj , denoted as wk. We want to find the
warp path W ∗ = (w1, w2, . . . , wK) that defines the mini-
mum distance between the two curves, subject to boundary
conditions at the start and end, as well as constraints on
continuity and monotonicity. The DTW distance between
time series X and Xˆ is defined as follows:
st = W
∗ = DTW(X, Xˆ) = min
W

 1
K
√√√√ K∑
k=1
wk

 (9)
Similar to area difference, DTW is able to identify the re-
gions of small difference over a long period of time, but
DTW can handle time shift issues as well.
4.2. Estimating Anomaly Scores with Critic Outputs
During the training process, the Critic Cx has to distin-
guish between real input sequences and synthetic ones.
Because we use the Wasserstein-1 distance when training
Cx, the outputs can be seen as an indicator of how real
(larger value) or fake (smaller value) a sequence is. There-
fore, once the Critic is trained, it can directly serve as an
anomaly measure for time series sequences.
Similar to the reconstruction errors, at time step j, we have
a collection of Critic scores (cqi , i + q = j). We apply
kernel density estimation (KDE) on the collection and then
take the maximum value as the smoothed value cj Now the
Critic score sequence is (c1, c2, . . . , cT ). We show in our
experiments that it is indeed the case that the Critic assigns
different scores to anomalous regions compared to normal
regions. This allows for the use of thresholding techniques
to identify the anomalous regions.
4.3. Combining Both Scores
The reconstruction errors RE(x) and Critic outputs Cx(x)
cannot be directly used together as anomaly scores. Intu-
itively, the larger RE(x) and the smaller Cx(x) indicate
higher anomaly scores. Therefore, we first compute the
mean and standard deviation of RE(x) and Cx(x), and
then calculate their respective z-scoresZRE(x) and ZCx(x)
to normalize both. Larger z-scores indicate high anomaly
scores.
We have explored different ways to leverage ZRE(x) and
ZCx(x). As shown in Table 4 (row 1–4), we first tested
three types of ZRE(x) and ZCx(x) individually. We then
explored two different ways to combine them (row 5 to the
last row). First, we attempt to merge them into a single
value a(x) with a convex combination (cf. line 19) [24,
33]:
a(x) = αZRE(x) + (1− α)ZCx(x) (10)
where α controls the relative importance of the two terms
(by default alpha = 0.5). Second, we try to multiply both
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scores to emphasize the high values:
a(x) = αZRE(x) ⊙ ZCx(x) (11)
where α = 1 by default. Both methods result in robust
anomaly scores. The results are reported in Section 5.3.
4.4. Identifying Anomalous Sequences
Finding anomalous sequences with locally adaptive
thresholding: Once we obtain anomaly scores at every
time step, thresholding techniques can be applied to iden-
tify anomalous sequences. We use sliding windows to com-
pute thresholds, and empirically set the window size as T3
and the step size as T3∗10 . This is helpful to identify con-
textual anomalies whose contextual information is usually
unknown. The sliding window size determines the num-
ber of historical anomaly scores to evaluate the current
threshold. For each sliding window, we use a simple static
threshold defined as 4 standard deviations from the mean
of the window. We can then identify those points whose
anomaly score is larger than the threshold as anomalous.
Thus, continuous time points compose into anomalous se-
quences (or windows): {aiseq, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K}, where
a
i
seq = (astart(i), . . . ,aend(i)) .
Mitigating false positives: The use of sliding windows can
increase recall of anomalies but may also produce many
false positives. We employ an anomaly pruning approach
inspired by Hundman et al. [21] to mitigate false positives.
At first, for each anomalous sequence, we use the maxi-
mum anomaly score to represent it, obtaining a set of max-
imum values {aimax, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K}. Once these val-
ues are sorted in descending order, we can compute the
decrease percent pi = (ai−1max − a
i
max)/a
i−1
max. When
the first pi does not exceed a certain threshold θ (by de-
fault θ = 0.1), we reclassify all subsequent sequences (i.e.,
{ajseq, i ≤ j ≤ K}) as normal.
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Datasets
To measure the performance of TadGAN, we evaluate it on
multiple time series datasets. In total, we have collected
11 datasets (a total of 492 signals) across a variety of ap-
plication domains. We use spacecraft telemetry signals
provided by NASA2, consisting of two datasets: Mars Sci-
ence Laboratory (MSL) and Soil Moisture Active Passive
(SMAP). In addition, we use Yahoo S5 which contains four
different sub-datasets 3 The A1 dataset is based on real pro-
duction traffic to Yahoo computing systems, while A2, A3
2Spacecraft telemetry data:
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/telemanom/data.zip
3Yahoo S5 data can be requested here:
https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/catalog.php?datatype=s&did=70
and A4 are all synthetic datasets. Lastly, we use Numenta
Anomaly Benchmark (NAB). NAB [23] includesmultiple
types of time series data from various application domains4
We have picked five datasets: Art, AdEx, AWS, Traf, and
Tweets.
Datasets from different sources contain different numbers
of signals and anomalies, and the locations of anomalies are
known for each signal. Basic information for each dataset
is summarized in Table 2. For each dataset, we present the
total number of signals and the amount of anomalies per-
taining to them. We also observe whether the anomalies
in the dataset are a single “point” anomalies or a collec-
tions. In order to suss out the ease of anomaly identifica-
tion, we measure how out of the ordinary each anomaly
point is by categorizing it as “out-of-dist” if it falls 4 stan-
dard deviations away from the mean of all the data for a sig-
nal. As each dataset has some quality that make detecting
its anomalies more challenging, this diverse selection will
help us identify the effectiveness and limitations of each
baseline.
5.2. Experimental setup
5.2.1. DATA PREPARATION
For each dataset, we first normalize the data betweeen
[−1, 1]. Then we find a proper interval over which to aggre-
gate the data, so that we have several thousands of equally
spaced points in time for each signal. We then set a window
size t = 100 and step size s = 1 to obtain training samples
for TadGAN. Because many signals in the Yahoo datasets
contain linear trends, we apply a simple detrending func-
tion (which subracts the result of a linear least-squares fit
to the signal) before training and testing.
5.2.2. ARCHITECTURE
In our experiments, inputs to TadGAN are time series se-
quences of length 100 (domainX) and the latent space (do-
main Z) is 20-dimensional. We use a 1-layer bidirectional
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) with 100 hidden units
as Generator E , and a 2-layer bidirectional LSTM with 64
hidden units each asGenerator G, where dropout is applied.
We add a 1-D convolutional layer for both Critics, with the
intention of capturing local temporal features that can deter-
mine how anomalous a sequence is. The model is trained
on a specific signal from one dataset for 2000 iterations,
with a batch size of 64.
4NAB data: https://github.com/numenta/NAB/tree/master/data
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Property SMAP MSL A1 A2 A3 A4 Art AdEx AWS Traf Tweets
# SIGNALS 53 27 67 100 100 100 6 5 17 7 10
# ANOMALIES 67 36 178 200 939 835 6 11 30 14 33
point (len = 1) 0 0 68 33 935 833 0 0 0 0 0
collective (len > 1) 67 36 110 167 4 2 6 11 30 14 33
# ANOMALY POINTS 54696 7766 1669 466 943 837 2418 795 6312 1560 15651
# out-of-dist 18126 642 861 153 21 49 123 15 210 86 520
(% tot.) 33.1% 8.3% 51.6% 32.8% 2.2% 5.9% 5.1% 1.9% 3.3% 5.5% 3.3%
# DATA POINTS 562800 132046 94866 142100 168000 168000 24192 7965 67644 15662 158511
IS SYNTHETIC? X X X X
Table 2. Dataset summary with information about the anomaly types. Overall the benchmark dataset contains a total of 492 signals and
2349 anomalies.
5.2.3. EVALUATION METRICS
Wemeasure the performance of differentmethods using the
commonly used metrics Precision, Recall and F1-Score. In
many real-world application scenarios, anomalies are rare
and usually window-based (i.e. a continuous sequence of
points—see Sec. 4.4). From the perspective of end-users,
the best outcome is to receive timely true alarms without
too many false positives (FPs), as these may waste time
and resources. To penalize high FPs and reward the timely
true alarms, we present the following window-based rules:
(1) If a known anomalous window overlaps any predicted
windows, a TP is recorded. (2) If a known anomalous
window does not overlap any predicted windows, a FN is
recorded. (3) If a predicted window does not overlap any
labeled anomalous region, a FP is recorded. This method
is also used in Hundman et al’s work [21].
5.2.4. BASELINES
The baseline methods can be divided into three categories:
prediction-based methods, reconstruction-based methods,
and online commercial tools.
ARIMA (Prediction-based). An autoregressive integrated
moving average (ARIMA) model is a popular statistical
analysis model that learns the autocorrelations in the time
series for future value prediction. We use point-wise pre-
diction errors as the anomaly scores to detect anomalies.
HTM (Prediction-based). Hierarchial Temporal Memory
(HTM) [1] has shown better performance over many statis-
tical analysis models in the Numenta Anomaly Benchmark.
It encodes the current input to a hidden state and predicts
the next hidden state. Prediction errors are computed as the
differences between the predicted state and the true state,
which are then used as the anomaly scores for anomaly de-
tection.
LSTM (Prediction-based). The neural network used in our
experiments consists of two LSTM layers with 80 units
each, and a subsequent dense layer with one unit which
predicts the value at the next time step (similar to the one
used by Hundman et al. [21]). Point-wise prediction errors
are used for anomaly detection.
AutoEncoder (Reconstruction-based). Our approach can
be viewed as a special instance of “adversarial autoen-
coders” [25], E ◦ G : X → X . Thus, we compare our
method with standard autoencoders with dense layers or
LSTM layers [27]. The dense autoencoder consists of three
Dense layers with 60, 20 and 60 units respectively. The
LSTM autoencoder contains two LSTM layers each having
60 units. Again, a point-wise reconstruction error is used
to detect anomalies.
MAD-GAN (Reconstruction-based). This method [24]
uses a vanilla GAN along with an optimal instance search-
ing strategy in latent space to support multivariate time se-
ries reconstruction. We use MAD-GAN to compute the
anomaly scores at every time step and then apply the same
anomaly detection method introduced in Sec. 4.4 to find
anomalies.
Microsoft Azure Anomaly Detector (Commercial tool).
Microsoft uses Spectral Residual Convolutional Neural
Networks (SR-CNN) in which the models are applied se-
rially [30]. The SR model is responsible for saliency de-
tection and the CNN is responsible for learning a discrimi-
nating threshold. The output of the model is a sequence of
binary labels that is attributed to each timestamp.
Amazon DeepAR (Commercial tool). DeepAR is a prob-
abilistic forecasting model with autoregressive recurrent
networks [32]. We use this model in a similar man-
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Baseline MSL SMAP A1 A2 A3 A4 Art AdEx AWS Traf Tweets Mean±SD
TadGAN 0.623 0.704 0.8 0.867 0.685 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.644 0.486 0.609 0.700±0.123
(P) LSTM 0.46 0.69 0.744 0.98 0.772 0.645 0.375 0.538 0.474 0.634 0.543 0.623±0.163
(P) Arima 0.492 0.42 0.726 0.836 0.815 0.703 0.353 0.583 0.518 0.571 0.567 0.599±0.148
(C) DeepAR 0.583 0.453 0.532 0.929 0.467 0.454 0.545 0.615 0.39 0.6 0.542 0.555±0.130
(R) LstmAE 0.507 0.672 0.608 0.871 0.248 0.163 0.545 0.571 0.764 0.552 0.542 0.549±0.193
(P) HTM 0.412 0.557 0.588 0.662 0.325 0.287 0.455 0.519 0.571 0.474 0.526 0.489±0.108
(R) DenseAE 0.507 0.7 0.472 0.294 0.074 0.09 0.444 0.267 0.64 0.333 0.057 0.353±0.212
(R) MAD-GAN 0.111 0.128 0.37 0.439 0.589 0.464 0.324 0.297 0.273 0.412 0.444 0.35±0.137
(C) MS Azure 0.218 0.118 0.352 0.612 0.257 0.204 0.125 0.066 0.173 0.166 0.118 0.219±0.145
Table 3. F1-Scores of baseline models using window-based rules. Color encodes the performance of the F1 score. One is evenly divided
into 10 bins, with each bin associated with one color. From dark red to dark blue, F1 score increases from 0 to 1.
ner as LSTM in a sense that it’s a prediction-based ap-
proach. Anomaly scores are presented as the regression
errors which are computed as the distance between the me-
dian of the predicted value and true value.
5.3. Benchmarking Results
TadGAN outperformed all the baseline methods by hav-
ing the highest averaged F1 score (0.7) across all the
datasets. Table 3 ranks all the methods based on their aver-
aged F1 scores (the last column) across the eleven datasets.
The second (LSTM, 0.623) and the third (Arima, 0.599)
best are both prediction-based methods and TadGAN out-
performed them by 12.46% and 16.86%, respectively, in
respect with the averaged F1 score.
Synthetic data v.s. real-world datasets. Although
TadGAN outperforms all baselines on average, we can no-
tice that it ranks below Arima when detecting anomalies
within synthetic dataset with point anomalies. Specifically,
TadGAN achieved an average of 0.717 while Arima scored
an average of 0.784. However, TadGAN still produces com-
petitive results in both scenarios.
How well do AutoEncoders perform? To view the superi-
ority of GAN, we compare it to other reconstruction-based
method such as LSTM AE, and Dense AE. One striking re-
sult is that the auto encoder alone does not perform well on
point anomalies. We observe that as LSTM AE and Dense
AE obtained an average F1 Score on A3 and A4 of 0.205
and 0.082 respectively. On the other hand, TadGAN and
MAD-GAN achieved a higher score of 0.643 and 0.527
respectively. One potential reason could be that AutoEn-
coders are optimizing L2 function and strictly attempt to fit
the data, resulting in that anomalies get fitted as well. How-
ever, adversarial learning does not have this type of issue.
TadGAN v.s. MadGAN. Overall, TadGAN (0.7) outper-
formed Mad-GAN (0.219) significantly. This fully demon-
strates the usage of forward cycle-consistency loss (Eq. 5)
which prevents the contradiction between two Generators
E and G and paves the most direct way to the optimal zi
that corresponds to the testing sample xi. Mad-GAN uses
only vanilla GAN and does not include any regularization
mechanisms to guarantee the mapping route xi → zi → xˆi.
Their approach to finding the optimal zi is that they first
sample a random z from the latent space and then opti-
mize it with gradient descent algorithm by optimizing the
anomaly detection loss.
5.4. Ablation Study
We evaluated multiple variations of TadGAN, each varia-
tion using different anomaly score computation methods
(Sec. 4.3). The results are summarized in Table 4. Here
we reported some impressive insights.
Only using Critic is unstable, because it has the lowest
averaged F1 score (0.29) and the highest standard devia-
tion (0.237). Only using Critic can achieve good perfor-
mance in some datasets such as SMAP and Art, but its
performance may also be unexpectedly bad such as in A2,
A3, A4, AdEx, and Traf. No clear shared characteristics
are identified among these five datasets (see Table 2). For
example, some datasets contain only collective anomalies
(Traf, AdEx) while other datasets like A3 and A4 may have
point anomalies as the majority types of anomalies. Per-
haps one explanation could be that Critic’s behavior is un-
predictable when confronted with anomalies (x ≁ PX ),
because it is only taught to distinguish real time segments
(x ∼ PX ) from generated ones.
DTW outperforms the other two reconstruction error
types slightly. Among all the variations, Critic×DTW
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Variation MSL SMAP A1 A2 A3 A4 Art AdEx AWS Traf Tweets Mean+SD
Critic 0.393 0.672 0.285 0.118 0.008 0.024 0.625 0 0.35 0.167 0.548 0.290±0.237
Point 0.585 0.588 0.674 0.758 0.628 0.6 0.588 0.611 0.551 0.383 0.571 0.594±0.086
Area 0.525 0.655 0.681 0.82 0.567 0.523 0.625 0.645 0.59 0.435 0.559 0.602±0.096
DTW 0.514 0.581 0.697 0.794 0.613 0.547 0.714 0.69 0.633 0.455 0.559 0.618±0.095
Critic×Point 0.619 0.675 0.703 0.75 0.685 0.536 0.588 0.579 0.576 0.4 0.59 0.609±0.091
Critic+Point 0.529 0.653 0.8 0.78 0.571 0.44 0.625 0.595 0.644 0.439 0.592 0.606±0.111
Critic×Area 0.578 0.704 0.719 0.867 0.587 0.46 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.571 0.625±0.131
Critic+Area 0.493 0.692 0.789 0.847 0.483 0.367 0.75 0.75 0.607 0.474 0.6 0.623±0.148
Critic×DTW 0.623 0.68 0.667 0.82 0.631 0.497 0.667 0.667 0.61 0.455 0.605 0.629±0.091
Critic+DTW 0.462 0.658 0.735 0.857 0.523 0.388 0.667 0.8 0.632 0.486 0.609 0.620±0.139
Mean 0.532 0.655 0.675 0.741 0.529 0.438 0.664 0.593 0.579 0.409 0.580
SD 0.068 0.039 0.137 0.211 0.182 0.154 0.067 0.209 0.081 0.087 0.02
Table 4. F1-Scores of all the variations of our model.
has the best score (0.629). Further, its standard devia-
tion is smaller than most of the other variations except for
Point, indicating this combination is more stable than oth-
ers. Therefore, this combination would be the safe choice
when we are encountering new datasets without labels.
Combining Critic outputs and reconstruction errors
does improve the performance in most cases. In most
cases, the combination ways achieve the best performance
except fro A4. Let us take MSL dataset as an example. We
observe that the F1 score of simply using DTW is 0.514.
After multiplying the Critic score, we obtain 0.623 despite
the fact that the F1 score of using Critic only is 0.393. In
addition, we can find that after combining the Critic scores,
the averaged F1 score is improved for each of the individ-
ual reconstruction error computation methods. However,
one interesting pattern is that for dataset A4 that is almost
consisted of point anomalies, using only point-wise errors
achieve the best performance.
Multiplication is a better option than convex combi-
nation. Multiplication constantly has higher aver-
aged F1 score than convex combination’s when using the
same reconstruction error type (e.g., CritictimePoint v.s.
Critic+Point). Moreover, multiplication also has smaller
standard deviations constantly. Thus, multiplication is the
recommended way to combine reconstruction scores and
Critic scores. This can be explained by the intuition that
multiplication can better amplify high anomaly scores.
5.5. Limitations and Discussion
We compare our approach to one of the well-known GAN-
based anomaly detection methods [24]. However, there is a
copious amount of GAN architectures tailored for time se-
ries reconstruction such as Time-Series GAN [37]. Given
our modular design, we enable any reconstruction-based
algorithm of time series to employ our anomaly scoring
method for time series anomaly detection. In the future,
we plan to investigate various strategies for time-series re-
construction and compare their performance to the current
state-of-the-art.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel TadGAN framework
that allows for time series reconstruction and effective
anomaly detection, showing how GANs can be effectively
used for anomaly detection in time series data. We explored
point-wise and window-based methods to compute recon-
struction errors. We further proposed two different ways
to combine reconstruction errors and Critic outputs to ob-
tain anomaly scores at every time step. We have also tested
several anomaly-scoring techniques and reported the best-
suited one in this work. Our experimental results showed
that (1) TadGAN outperformed all the baseline methods by
having the highest averaged F1 score across all the datasets,
and showed superior performance over baseline methods in
6 out of 11 datasets; (2) window-based reconstruction er-
rors outperformed the point-wise method; and (3) the com-
bination of both reconstruction errors and critic outputs of-
fer more robust anomaly scores, which help to reduce the
number of false positives as well as increase the number
of true positives. Finally, our code is open source and is
available as a tool for benchmarking time series datasets
for anomaly detection.
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Appendix
NASA Yahoo S5 NAB
Variation MSL SMAP A1 A2 A3 A4 Art AdEx AWS Traf Tweets
P 0.318 0.484 0.552 0.576 0.729 0.569 0.313 0.438 0.5 0.375 0.625
HTM R 0.657 0.583 0.629 0.78 0.209 0.192 0.833 0.636 0.667 0.643 0.455
F1 0.557 0.412 0.588 0.662 0.325 0.287 0.455 0.519 0.571 0.474 0.526
P 0.359 0.649 0.689 0.975 0.987 0.896 0.3 0.467 0.474 0.481 0.514
LSTM R 0.639 0.758 0.809 0.985 0.634 0.504 0.5 0.636 0.6 0.929 0.576
F1 0.46 0.699 0.744 0.98 0.772 0.645 0.375 0.538 0.474 0.634 0.543
P 0.356 0.368 0.648 0.747 0.997 0.938 0.273 0.538 0.4 0.462 0.559
Arima R 0.8 0.488 0.826 0.95 0.689 0.562 0.5 0.636 0.733 0.75 0.576
F1 0.492 0.42 0.726 0.836 0.815 0.703 0.353 0.583 0.518 0.571 0.567
Dense
AE
P 0.514 0.792 0.853 0.921 0.937 0.433 0.667 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5
R 0.326 0.626 0.433 0.175 0.038 0.05 0.333 0.182 0.533 0.286 0.03
F1 0.507 0.7 0.472 0.294 0.074 0.09 0.444 0.267 0.64 0.333 0.057
LSTM
AE
P 0.514 0.657 0.656 0.848 0.9 0.599 0.6 0.6 0.84 0.533 0.615
R 0.5 0.687 0.567 0.895 0.144 0.095 0.5 0.545 0.7 0.571 0.485
F1 0.507 0.672 0.608 0.871 0.248 0.163 0.545 0.571 0.764 0.552 0.542
MAD-
GAN
P 0.167 0.222 0.253 0.296 0.502 0.321 0.193 0.174 0.16 0.259 0.309
R 0.083 0.09 0.68 0.848 0.709 0.834 1 1 0.9 1 0.787
F1 0.111 0.128 0.369 0.439 0.588 0.463 0.324 0.297 0.273 0.412 0.444
MS
Azure
P 0.167 0.129 0.328 0.64 0.64 0.41 0.114 0.21 0.189 0.313 0.159
R 0.314 0.1 0.638 0.648 0.169 0.194 0.194 0.058 0.176 0.146 0.106
F1 0.218 0.118 0.352 0.612 0.257 0.204 0.125 0.066 0.173 0.166 0.118
DeepAR
P 0.617 0.436 0.664 0.913 0.926 0.9 0.6 0.533 0.308 0.563 0.615
R 0.552 0.472 0.444 0.945 0.313 0.303 0.5 0.727 0.533 0.643 0.485
F1 0.583 0.453 0.532 0.929 0.467 0.454 0.545 0.615 0.39 0.6 0.542
Table 5. Precision, Recall and F1-Scores of baseline models
